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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS









On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-246)
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2009
Before:   FUENTES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed on June 04, 2009 )
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Dennis Spriggs appeals the denial by the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, the District Court had jurisdiction to consider the effect1
of the Sentencing Guidelines amendments on Spriggs’s sentence.  See United States v.
Mateo, — F.3d —, 2009 WL 750411, *2 n.1, *3 (3d Cir. March 24, 2009).  We have
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of Spriggs’s motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Because the District Court correctly determined that it did not have
authority to reduce Spriggs’s sentence, we will affirm.  
 I. Background
Spriggs pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court determined that Spriggs
was a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, set his offense level
based on the career offender table at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and sentenced him to ninety-six
months in prison.  Spriggs filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to have his
sentence reduced based on the recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that
retroactively lowered the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses.  The District
Court denied his motion, stating simply that “[d]ue to defendant’s status as a career
offender, the guideline range remains the same.”  (App. 3.)  Spriggs filed a timely notice
of appeal and contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion. 
II. Discussion  1
When a defendant files a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c), the district court conducts a two-step analysis.  First, it determines whether the
defendant “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
3that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2).  If the defendant’s sentencing range has not been lowered, the district court
is not authorized to reduce the sentence and must deny the motion.  See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2) (“A reduction in the defendant’s term of
imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if ... (B) an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not
have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.”).  If the
defendant’s sentencing range has been lowered, the district court is to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors and the applicable policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines in
deciding whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). 
Because the first step required the District Court to interpret the Sentencing
Guidelines, we review de novo its decision at that step of the analysis.  See United States
v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 377 (3d Cir.2003).  As the second step involved the exercise of
the District Court’s discretion, we review that portion of the analysis for abuse of
discretion.  See Mateo,  — F.3d —, 2009 WL 750411, *2 n.2. 
As we recently explained in United States v. Mateo, the crack cocaine amendments
did not lower the sentencing ranges of defendants who were sentenced on the basis of
their status as career offenders.  Mateo,  — F.3d —, 2009 WL 750411, *3.  (The
amendment to the crack cocaine guidelines “simply ‘provides no benefit to career
4offenders’”) (quoting United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir, 2009)).  
Because Spriggs’s sentence range was based on his status as a career offender, it was not
lowered by the crack cocaine amendments, and the District Court was not authorized to
reduce his sentence.  The District Court properly denied Spriggs’s motion at step one and
did not need to continue to the second part of the analysis. 
III. Conclusion 
Because the District Court correctly determined that it did not have authority to
reduce Spriggs’s sentence, we will affirm. 
